Showing 1 - 10 of 1,126
make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079
This paper studies relational incentive contracts with persistent states in the presence of both moral hazard and information asymmetry. The optimal contracts are dynamic in which the agents are rewarded following a high output by moving to a higher continuation payoff in the next period. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849872
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent relationship with on-the-job search. On-the-job search is modeled as a dimension of the agent's effort vector that has no effect on output, but raises his future outside option. The agent's incentives to search are increasing in the degree to which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338954
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796
This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069
We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550469
reputation cannot credibly commit to exerting effort when working alone. However, by hiring and working with juniors of uncertain … reputation, seniors will have incentives to exert effort. Incentives for young agents arise from a concern for their own … reputation (and the opportunity to take over the firm) but older agents work for the reputation of their firms (and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028000
Does a worker who had a successful career have stronger or weaker incentives to manipulate his reputation than a worker … employment histories that lead to the same worker's reputation. (With reputation we refer to beliefs about the worker's future … productivity.) We show that, typically, workers with a better reputation have stronger incentives than workers with a worse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096875