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make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300994
We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550469
We re-examine the role of managers in preventing free riding when team inputs are not observable. Holmström (1982) shows that managers are necessary due to the team's lack of static incentives to implement budget-breaking group punishments. We ask whether the team can break its own budget in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824227
This paper studies relational incentive contracts with persistent states in the presence of both moral hazard and information asymmetry. The optimal contracts are dynamic in which the agents are rewarded following a high output by moving to a higher continuation payoff in the next period. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849872
This article explores a dynamic moral hazard setting in which a principal hires a team of agents for a project. As the project generates revenue upon completion, the principal incentivizes agents' efforts by designing bonuses for success. If bonuses are provided through spot or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014353011
We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent relationship with on-the-job search. On-the-job search is modeled as a dimension of the agent's effort vector that has no effect on output, but raises his future outside option. The agent's incentives to search are increasing in the degree to which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338954
The discussion about health care systems focuses on the dynamics of expenditures and on the weak growth of the revenue base. In this discussion it is widely overseen that medical expenditures and supply of medical services crucially depend on the compensation of physician services. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009746197
Does a worker who had a successful career have stronger or weaker incentives to manipulate his reputation than a worker … employment histories that lead to the same worker's reputation. (With reputation we refer to beliefs about the worker's future … productivity.) We show that, typically, workers with a better reputation have stronger incentives than workers with a worse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096875
Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too weak … incentives to investigate cost further when expected cost of treatment is greater than benefit. Making gatekeepers residual … claimants with a fixed fee from which treat-ment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011511048