Directors and supervisory board members (officers) are increasingly being held personally liable. Directors & Officers (D&O) liability insurance offers directors and supervisory board members ample protection against directors' and officers' liability. On the one hand, this has many advantages...

Insurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group...

Der Beitrag enthält eine anreiztheoretische Analyse der Versicherungssysteme, die zur Entschädigung von Kosten und Verlusten aus Tierseuchenausbrüchen in den EUMitgliedsländern eingerichtet sind. Es wird gezeigt, dass Kompensationszahlungen zur Erzielung effizienter Schadenverhütungsanreize...

This paper investigates the impact of insurance contract design on the behavior of filing fraudulent claims in an experimental setup. We test how fraud behavior varies for insurance contracts with full coverage, a straight deductible or variable premiums (bonus-malus contract). In our...

This paper examines the relation between tournament incentives and reserve management. We find a positive relation between internal tournament incentives and reserve errors, implying that a larger pay gap as a tournament prize induces vice presidents (VPs) to overestimate loss reserves. In other...

We propose a new reserve error measure net of loss development forecasting error using the most basic actuarial technique of estimating loss development. We argue that the proposed measure is better for capturing managerial discretion than the traditional reserve error measures due to its...

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market-implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992-2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk-sharing through equity-based incentive compensation. We find that long-term incentives and other share-based...

We explore experimentally a cognitive-effort channel through which defaults might influence behavior in an environment where the choice architect has misaligned incentives. Our experimental setting is an insurance market where the firm is better informed about the aggregate statistical risk...

We propose a mechanism for the incentivization of workers in decentralized autonomous organizations instantiated on the blockchain. Our approach relies on staking, a digital form of collateralization that requires network participants to acquire cryptographic tokens and deposit them in a smart...

In a pervasive but controversial practice, drug firms frequently make monetary or in-kind payments to medical providers. Critics are concerned that drug firms are distorting prescribing behavior away from the best interests of patients, while defenders of the practice claim that payments arise...