Research Question/Issue: Do large, within-firm executive pay differences hurt firm performance? Prior literature shows mixed results concerning the sign of the relationship between executive pay disparity and firm performance. This study evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament...

In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by...

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...

We develop a theoretical model in which for-profit and nonprofit employers compete to hire a worker who derives intrinsic motivation from the nonprofit's social mission. We also use a unique data set of California establishments to provide new evidence on sectorial differences in pay and HRM...

Using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) employer survey, we document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. Among other results, we also show that: wage increases associated with...