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We investigate the effects of organizational culture and personal value orientations on performance under individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group favoritism predicting interaction effects between organizational culture and personal values in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010393276
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem which are not easily … optimality and the relation to the special case of tournaments. It emerges that for a group of identical risk-neutral agents, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343933
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308439
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of the bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011741744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012172857
Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual data on 2 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010192352
We analyze relational contracts for a set of agents when either (a) only aggregate output or (b) individual outputs are observable. A team incentive scheme, where each agent is paid a bonus for aggregate output above a threshold, is optimal in case (a). The team's efficiency may increase...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010349864
Economic theory suggests that performance pay may serve as an effective screening device to attract productive agents. The existing evidence on the self-selection of agents is largely limited to job tasks where performance is driven by routine, well-defined procedures. This study presents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498559
To test and replicate the superstar effect reported by Brown (2011) we empirically study contests where a single entrant has an endogenously higher probability of winning. Unlike the previous literature, we test for the presence of the superstar effect in several different contexts. Ultimately,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647661
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006