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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317592
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Specific Knowledge and Performance Measurement
Raith, Michael - 2008
I examine optimal incentives and performance measurement in a model where an agent has specific knowledge (in the sense of Jensen and Meckling) about the consequences of his actions for the principal. Contracts can be based both on "input" measures related to the agent's actions, and an "output"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047410
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Stock-based compensation plans and employee incentives
Zábojník, Ján - 2014
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
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Relative performance pay, bonuses, and job-promotion tournaments
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - 2008
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343925
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
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Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
Daines, Robert - 2016
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
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Performance-Based Compensation and Firm Value – Experimental Evidence
Pfeiffer, Glenn - 2015
positive price reactions to adoption of performance-based compensation plans for executive managers, but postulating competing … selection and moral hazard on equity prices. We find that managers select contracts based on their private information … contract and is reflected in stock prices. We refer to this as the sorting effect. Additionally, we find that managers do not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036078