Similar Search Results

Wang, Xiaoming; Xu, Tingting - In: Pacific-Basin finance journal 74 (2022), pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013389293

Ingratiation and favoritism : experimental evidence

Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - 2012

held by the manager. In the Random treatment, workers can also change opinion but payoffs are assigned randomly, which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009537226

Merit Pay and Pain : Linking Congressional Pay to Performance

McPike, Jonathan David - 2011

Despite the Founding Fathers' careful planning, the reason for the public's lack of confidence in Congress is that elections, like the institutional checks and balances of federalism and separation of powers, are necessary but not sufficient to ensure that Congress acts in the best interests of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132927

Dynamic Multitasking and Managerial Investment Incentives

Hoffmann, Florian - 2020

We study non-contractible intangible investment in a dynamic agency model with multitasking. The manager's short …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852466

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949331

Managerial Compensation and Outcome Volatility

Chen, Xiaoyan - 2018

We present a simple discrete-time version of the continuous-time agency model under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties, which conveniently captures a number of important properties of optimal contracts without having to rely on complex continuous-time mathematical issues. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924934

The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2017

We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704

Optimal Managerial Hedging and Contracting with Self-Esteem Concerns

Choe, Chongwoo - 2015

studies how self-esteem concerns influence a manager's effort choice and hedging behavior and how a board designs the … managerial compensation in response. We show that when the manager has stronger self-esteem concerns, it requires higher … managerial ownership to induce effort. In equilibrium, the manager's net hedging position increases with the strength of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035750

Contract Competition between Hierarchies, Managerial Compensation and Imperfectly Correlated Shocks

Cella, Michela - 2016

We analyze competition through incentive contracts for managers in duopoly. Privately informed managers exert surplus enhancing effort that generates an externality on the rival. Asymmetric information on imperfectly correlated shocks creates a two-way distortion of efforts under strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999482

Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent

Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020

We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), we demonstrate that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253115