This paper examines how professional female tennisplayers react to: i) prize incentives and ii) heterogeneity in ex ante players' abilities. It is found that a larger prize spread encourages women to increase effort, even when controlling for many tournament and player characteristics. Further...

When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring...

Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive...

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, which provides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use the lessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance in practice. -- incentives ; pay for...

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird eine modelltheoretische Untersuchung der verschärften sogenannten Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG anhand der Turniertheorie vorgenommen. Hierzu wird ein Modell entwickelt, um mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen der Verminderung...

Two alternative relative compensation schemes are compared with respect to total output that can be generated at a given sum of salaries. While the promotion regime guarantees that any salary increase is permanent, the premium system allows a reduction in the income of an agent to the base...

This study uses panel data describing about 6,500 employees in a large international company to study the incentive effects of performance related pay. The company uses two performance related remuneration mechanisms. One is an individual ''surprise'' bonus payment. The other is a more...

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...