We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...

High Performance Work Systems are generally considered to have a positive impact on workers' well-being. But is this actually the case? This article will discuss this question from the point of view of "End of Fun", a controversial and widely-discussed book by Judith Mair (2003), claiming that...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages on optimal job design within firms. In our model, two tasks affect firm value and an imperfect performance measure. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. Yet a sufficiently large wage floor...

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

Mit der Einführung der Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende im Jahr 2005 wurde in Deutschland ein System von Sanktionen implementiert, das für Arbeitslosengeld(ALG)-II-Bezieher im Alter von unter 25 Jahren besonders starke Leistungsminderungen nach sich ziehen kann. In unserem...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

This conceptual article examines how Sustainable Human Resource Management (Sustainable HRM) can help establishing an attractive employer brand that can address the different needs and expectations of potential and existing employees, without compromising a consistent employer image, which can...