We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the … framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by … to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally …

-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric … players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields …

advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …

ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics. It turns out that …. In particular, we are unable to study dynamic military conflict as a series of “battles” that are resolved individually … subject to this limitation. Plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and …

ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat …

geographic location for inter-State conflict. The main predictions of the theory are that conflict tends to be more likely when …

conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player's valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We … predictable movements in the conflict's dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent …

the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of … conflict. We postulate a Tullock contest success function augmented by an externality: each group's strength is increased by … efforts. We then perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second CongoWar, a conflict that involves many groups in a …