Este artículo lleva a cabo una revisión de la literatura académica que estudia los determinantes del tamaño del sector público. En primer lugar, se analizan los modelos clásicos basados en el teorema del votante mediano, en el que las decisiones públicas vienen determinadas por las...

This paper aims to study the determinants of corruption by examining specificities relating to the region and the level of economic development. Starting from a cross-sectional study on 130 countries, we rely on the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach to address the issue of model...

Within the last two decades, 40% of rangelands in Uzbekistan have been taken out of use due to non-functioning water facilities and pasture degradation. A retrospective study of rangeland production system development in the former Soviet Union (FSU) shows that the pasture land was used more...

The paper analyses the 1996 EU food aid reform and addresses the question of its impact on improving EU food aid allocation in terms of reaching those countries which are most vulnerable to food insecurity. Using a two-stage regression model the analysis finds that EU food aid in kind is...

If property rights in land are so beneficial, why are they not adopted more widely? I propose a theory based on the idea that limited property rights over peasants' plots may be supported by elite landowners (who depend on peasants for labour) to achieve two goals. First, like other distortions...

Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice...

Peasant livestock producers are particularly disadvantaged internationally and within their national systems because their political participation tends to be mediated through patron-client ties. The consequence is that poor producers most often trade their collective interests for very modest...

When economic actors are also allowed to become politically active, perhaps to influence a government price policy, they face decision problems with essentially simultaneous political and economic features. If, in addition, two groups struggle to pull the administered price level in opposite...

We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...