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Corporate campaign contributions, repeat giving, and the rewards to legislator reputation

Krozner, Randall S.; Stratmann, Thomas - In: The journal of law & economics 48 (2005) 1, pp. 41-71

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002894577

How prices matter in politics : the returns to campaign advertising

Stratmann, Thomas - In: Public choice 140 (2009) 3/4, pp. 357-377

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875764

Tainted money? : contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Stratmann, Thomas - 2003

Campaign expenditures are not effective in increasing candidates vote shares if voters do not respond to the advertisement when they believe that campaign expenditures are financed with tainted money. In this situation, limiting contributions may reduce the number of policy favors that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509494

Some talk : money in politics ; a (partial) review of the literature

Stratmann, Thomas - In: Public choice 124 (2005) 1/2, pp. 135-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003160833

Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Stratmann, Thomas - In: Public choice 129 (2006) 3/4, pp. 461-474

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397007

Can special interests buy congressional votes? : Evidence from financial services legislation

Stratmann, Thomas - In: The journal of law & economics 45 (2002) 2,1, pp. 345-373

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001724637

Do strict electoral campaign finance rules limit corruption?

Stratmann, Thomas - In: CESifo DICE report : journal for institutional comparisons 1 (2003) 1, pp. 24-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001790823

Tainted money? : Contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Stratmann, Thomas - 2003

Campaign expenditures are not effective in increasing candidates' vote shares if voters do not respond to the advertisement when they believe that campaign expenditures are financed with "tainted money". In this situation, limiting contributions may reduce the number of policy favors that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001912344

The market for congressional votes : is timing of contributions everything?

Stratmann, Thomas - In: The journal of law & economics 41 (1998) 1, pp. 85-113

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001240182

Are contributors rational? : Untangling strategies of political action committees

Stratmann, Thomas - In: Journal of political economy 100 (1992) 3, pp. 647-664

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001129410