testable predictions. We test these in a laboratory experiment and find that observed election outcomes and vote shares are …We construct an election game to study the electoral impacts of biased candidate endorsements. We derive a set of … well predicted. We find no support, however, for our prediction that the relationship between election outcome and the …

voters' capacity to identify and empower well-suited politicians. In our model, candidates are heterogeneous in two … concentration of power in the hands of the election winner is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest is small. …

voters' capacity to identify and empower competent politicians. In our model, candidates are privately informed about their … motivation. In particular, full concentration of power is desirable if and only if politicians are mostly welfare-oriented. The …

database includes the level of funding, as well as the origin of the resources the politicians have at their disposal. The …

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but …, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self …-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can …

-tier political agency model with voters, politicians and bureaucrats. In the model's hierarchy, politicians are constrained by … election while bureaucrats are controlled by the budget. Bureaucrats' discretion provides them with political power to force … politicians to make compromise. If voters and bureaucrats prefer different types of politicians, i.e., they have a conflict of …

Politicians have limited ability to influence policy. This provides an incentive for politicians to feign, whereby they …