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Political polarization
Dixit, Avinash K. (contributor);  … - 2007 - This revision: April 19, 2007
Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003426464
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Why the Publication of Socially Harmful Information May Be Socially Desirable
Hahn, Volker - 2009
We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753186
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Why the publication of socially harmful information may be socially desirable
Hahn, Volker - 2009 - This version: November 2009
We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746680
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How avoiding overreaction to public information? : some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central bank should disclose or not its information, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
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Wondering how others interpret it : social value of public information
Gizatulina, Alia - 2013 - This version: April 2013
signals in the way that they suspect others are doing it. Consequently, the negative impact of public communication noted by … public signal at all, which suggests that there is a scope to "obliterate" public communication in a specific way, by making …, desirability for such obliteration and non-commonality of signals' understanding. -- transparency ; central bank communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742337
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Strategic Central Bank Communication : Discourse and Game -Theoretic Analyses of the Bank of Japan's Monthly Report
Kawamura, Kohei - 2016
expressions. Using a simple persuasion game, we argue that the use of ambiguity in communication by the central bank can be seen …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996817
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Multi-Dimensional Uncertainty And Central Bank Communication : What Do Central Bankers Talk About And Why?
Ashwin, Julian - 2022
When communicating with the public about the state of the economy, central bankers not only need to decide the messages they want to convey, but also how much to focus on various relevant economic variables. I consider a policymaker whose objective is to minimise the mean-squared error of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237667
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Optimal Public Communication
Gagliardone, Luca - 2022
results within the context of an application to central bank communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082668
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Central Bank Communication and Website Characteristics
Curti, Filippo; Kazinnik, Sophia - 2023
This paper investigates the characteristics of central bank websites across a large sample of central banks. We systematically derive and quantify these characteristics across three dimensions: text, visual presentation, and website performance. We then conduct a survey to isolate the main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014349276
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Attack When the World Is Not Watching? U.S. News and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Durante, Ruben; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina - 2020
Politicians may strategically time unpopular measures to coincide with newsworthy events that distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We find that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur when U.S. news on the following day...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014137923