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Besley, Timothy J.; Kudamatsu, Masayuki - 2008

One of the key goals of political economy is to understand how institutional arrangements shape policy outcomes. This paper studies a comparatively neglected aspect of this - the forces that shape heterogeneous performance of autocracies. The paper develops a simple theoretical model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218461

Democracy, dictatorship and the cultural transmission of political values

Ticchi, Davide; Verdier, Thierry; Vindigni, Andrea - 2013

individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state … and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their … between political regimes and political culture diffusion. Consolidated democracy emerges when sufficiently many people are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009755330

Coups, regime transitions, and institutional change

Bennett, Daniel L.; Bjørnskov, Christian; Gohmann, … - 2019

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific policies change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012021629

Participation, Competition and Political Regimes

Noguera, Jose de Jesus - 2008

This paper presents a classification of the political regimes based on their level of participation/inclusion and competition in the collective decision-making. We use the criteria developed to build a dataset for every currently independent country in the world for the period 1800-2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724182

Why do military dictatorships become presidential democracies? : mapping the democratic interests of autocratic regimes

Bjørnskov, Christian - 2017

This paper starts with the observation that almost all military dictatorships that democratize become presidential democracies. I hypothesize that military interests are able to coordinate on status-preserving institutional change prior to democratization and therefore prefer political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011763058