We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and environmental harm. We find that high-powered executive compensation packages can increase the odds of environmental law-breaking by 40-60% and the magnitude of environmental harm by over 100%. We document similar results for the...

It has often been asserted that imposition of environmental regulations in the 1970's may be a partial explanation for the productivity growth slowdowns experienced by most industrialized countries during that decade.The contention is that expenses incurred to satisfy these regulations, such as...

It has often been asserted that imposition of environmental regulations in the 1970's may be a partial explanation for the productivity growth slowdowns experienced by most industrialized countries during that decade.The contention is that expenses incurred to satisfy these regulations, such as...

We study how pay inequality among regulators affects the environment, using individual compensation data on attorneys at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Consistent with incentive theories, high-inequality EPA offices pursue more enforcement actions with higher monetary penalties,...

I investigate whether and how risk of environmental pollution affects executive compensation. Leveraging a novel database that tracks accidental chemical spills to the environment within the U.S., I study how salient environmental spills with large-scale evacuations affect executive compensation...