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Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting

Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015

We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305201

Public-good provision in large economies : robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting

Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015

implemented by a simple voting mechanism. With more public-good provision levels, more complicated mechanisms are required, but …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334017

Chapter 4. Economics of Common Property Management Regimes

Baland, Jean-Marie; Platteau, Jean-Philippe - In: Handbook of environmental economics : volume 1, …, (pp. 127-190). 2003

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the reasons for collective action failures and successes in natural resource management, and to understand, in the light of economic theory, the mode of operation of the factors involved whenever possible. In the first section, we clarify the notion of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023941

Public-Good Provision, Mechanism Design and Voting

Bierbrauer, Felix - 2015

We study the relation between mechanism design and voting in public-good provision. If incentive mechanisms must …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017868

Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty

Bierbrauer, Felix - 2009

priori unknown. The analysis is based on a mechanism design approach that imposes a requirement of robustness with respect to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013158141

Public-good provision with macro uncertainty about preferences : efficiency, budget balance, and robustness

Hellwig, Martin - 2021

mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet is shown to implement an effi cient provision rule with budget balance. However, first … mechanism is independent of the stochastic specification within the class of specifications defined by the structure of the …-Groves mechanism converges to zero in probability when the number of participants becomes large. In the limit, with a continuum of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657865

Collective decision through an informed mediator

Li, Yunan; Zhang, Xingtan - In: Journal of economic theory : JET 218 (2024), pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015070795

Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies : A Note

Deb, Rajat; Ohseto, Shinji - 2000

Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179633

Efficiency, welfare, and political competition

Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014

We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358277

The Replacement Principle for the Provision of Multiple Public Goods on Tree Networks

Umezawa, Masashi - 2016

We study the problem of providing two public goods on tree networks, in which each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if the number of agents is at least four, then there exists no social choice rule that satisfies efficiency and replacement-domination. In fact, it is shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195933