Secondary markets for long-term assets might be illiquid due to adverse selection. In a model in which moral hazard is confined to project initiation, I find that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of...

We provide new international evidence for a monetary policy liquidity transmission channel in the United States, United Kingdom, and the Eurozone. The central banks of these countries are, with a different degree, able to soften the economic downward spiral after an unexpected arrival of a...

This paper presents a model in which cash holding imposes a negative externality because it worsens future adverse selection in markets for long-term assets, which impairs their role for liquidity provision. Adverse selection worsens when potential sellers of long-term assets hold more cash...

Secondary markets for long-term assets might be illiquid due to adverse selection. In a model in which moral hazard is confined to project initiation, I find that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of...