We investigate behavior of optimal hedge fund leverage in a fund that has a compensation contract with high-water mark and hurdle rate provisions. A risk neutral fund manager can continuously reallocate assets while she obtains management and performance fees in discrete time moments. We find...

Active fee is the ratio between the excess cost of active management over the index alternative and the fund's activity level. We suggest a simple model that explains active capital allocations in the presence of time-varying active fee. We show that investors respond in accordance with the...

Fund managers are paid a fixed management fee in proportion to their assets under management. This means to maximize revenue, managers hoard assets. Whilst this results in increased revenue for the manager often, due to diseconomies of scale, it results in lower returns for the investor. Here we...

We show that risk-sharing considerations rationalize symmetric benchmark-adjusted ("fulcrum") fees in the compensation of informed active fund management. By tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark, investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize...