We investigate financial intermediaries’ interest rate risk management as the simultaneous decision of on-balance-sheet exposure and interest rate swap use. Our findings show that both decisions are substitute risk management strategies. A higher likelihood of bank distress makes banks reduce...

We investigate financial intermediaries interest rate risk management as the simultaneous decision of on-balance-sheet exposure and interest rate swap use. Our findings show that both decisions are substitute risk management strategies. Hausman exogeneity tests indicate that both decisions are...

We investigate financial intermediaries' interest rate risk management as the simultaneous decision of on-balance-sheet exposure and interest rate swap use. Our findings show that both decisions are substitute risk management strategies. A higher likelihood of bank distress makes banks reduce...

We investigate financial intermediaries' interest rate risk management as the simultaneous decision of on-balance-sheet exposure and interest rate swap use. Our findings show that both decisions are substitute risk management strategies. A higher likelihood of bank distress makes banks reduce...

This paper analyzes the effects of bank manager’s incentive pay on financial stability. Two banks are owned by risk-neutral principals and run by risk-averse managers that determine the level of leverage and how much to diversify into the other bank’s asset. Diversification and leverage in...

This paper examines the validity of the risk-return trade-off for a sample of Czech banks over the period 2002-2022 by analysing the relationship between the bank risk and risk-adjusted returns. I find evidence of a significant negative association between the regulatory risk measure and...

We investigate whether sovereign bond holdings of European banks are determined by a risk-return trade-off. Using data between 2011 and 2018 for 75 European banks, we confirm that banks exhibited risk-taking behavior during the sovereign debt crisis, e.g., due to moral suasion. In the period...

Under the new Basel bank capital framework, a bank must group its retail exposures into multiple segments with homogeneous risk characteristics. The U.S. regulatory agencies believe that a bank may use the internal models, including the loan-level risk parameter estimates such as PD and LGD, to...

Under the new Basel bank capital framework, each bank must group its retail exposures into multiple segments with homogeneous risk characteristics. The U.S. regulatory agencies believe that each bank may use its internal risk models for the loan-level risk parameter estimates such as probability...