Asset owners (principals) typically do not manage their own investments and leave this job to delegated managers (agents). What is best for the asset owner, however, is usually not best for the fund manager. Additional agency conflicts arise when the asset owner does not know the quality and...

The effect of self-default on the valuation of liabilities and derivatives (DVA) has been widely discussed but the effect on assets has not received similar attention. Any asset whose value depends on the status, or existence, of the firm will have a DVA. We extend Burgard&Kjaer (2011) to...

In this paper, we analyze the conflicts of interest of an informed agent who is responsible for divulging his private information about a company and has a reward function positively dependent on its stock price. We assume that the demand for the stock is subject to shocks that may increase...

This paper analyzes the determinants of governance transparency. In our model, entrepreneurs optimally decide the precision of their earning reporting by trading off the possibility of expropriating profits against the capacity to attract external funding.We find that information is only...

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its...

A prominent motive for corporate venture capital (CVC) is the identification of entrepreneurial-firm acquisition opportunities. Consistent with this view, we find that one of every five startups purchased by 61 top corporate investors from 1987 through 2003 is a venture portfolio company of its...

Although global investors have been paying more heed than ever to Corporate Governance for the last decade, the evolving premium risk stemming from variegated governance issues has not been factored yet into the expected return of any investor's portfolio. From a theoretical standpoint, this...

We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via information disclosure quality. We document a negative association between CEO options and the quality of future managerial disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO...

While takeover targets earn significant abnormal returns, studies tend to find no abnormal returns from investing in predicted takeover targets. In this study, we show that the difficulty of correctly identifying targets ex ante does not fully explain the below-expected returns to target...

We propose a theory in which each stock's environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score plays two roles: 1) providing information about firm fundamentals and 2) affecting investor preferences. The solution to the investor's portfolio problem is characterized by an ESG-efficient frontier,...