, but allowing shareholders to vote on more issues, such as executive compensation, may not affect the quality of governance … large shareholders and management. This is because majority rule offers little incentive for small shareholders to vote. I … majority of voters. Therefore, for issues on which management and small shareholders are likely to agree, majority rule is a …

We challenge the common law rule that shareholders can generally vote as they please, even if their intent or the … property rights and shareholders can bind themselves to vote as they please – are unpersuasive. We then argue that (1) the … general meeting is the company’s agent; (2) shareholders are generally not personally liable for the consequences of the …

This article explores the rising tension between shareholder and director power in the common law world. First the … article analyzes key arguments in the shareholder empowerment debate, and current US reform proposals to grant shareholders … common law jurisdictions. Secondly, the article discusses power shifts in the opposite direction – namely toward the board …

Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organizations. One of the problems with the extant literature on … positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare positions of the …-established approaches for the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organizations such as the Banzhaf measure; and thus they are all based …