What preferences motivate the severity of terrorist attacks? I investigate how Boko Haram terrorists adjust their fatalities when unexpectedly deprived of public attention, relative to Al Shabaab terrorists, that were not deprived of public attention. Losing public attention raises the severity...

This paper explores the impact of target CEOs' retirement preferences on takeovers. Using retirement age as proxy for CEOs' private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEOs' preferences affect merger activity. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher...

This paper introduces a two-stage winner-take-all contest model with reference-dependent preferences to study the determinants of conflict and its intensity. The existence of a Sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and characterization of the equilibrium are shown. Reference...

We consider allocation problemswith indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods, that can be viewed as extensions to the...

We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence,...

We consider allocation problemswith indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods, that can be viewed as extensions to the...

This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences...

A conclave is a voting mechanism in which a committee selects an alternative by voting until a sufficient supermajority is reached. We study experimentally welfare properties of simple three-voter conclaves with privately known preferences over two outcomes and waiting costs. The resulting game...

We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence,...

This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences...