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Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332338

The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - 2013

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183375

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji (contributor) - 2006

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by S¨onmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321321

Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sonmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733933

Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 547-586

We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672008

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689320

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801

Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem

Duggan, Joseph E. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/11, pp. 1-13

The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable … sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of … randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167988

The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings

Echenique, Federico; Lee, SangMok; Shum, Matthew; … - 2011

that are rationalizable as a stable matching when agents' preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple … nonparametric test for stability, in the tradition of revealed preference tests. We also characterize the observed stable matchings … unique stable matching, or that the matching be consistent with unrestricted monetary transfers. We also present results on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189213

Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples

Jochen Haake, Claus; Klaus, Bettina-Elisabeth - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215597