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Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595

notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante stability. This framework unifies known many-to-one and one …-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new … ex-ante stability, equal treatment, and constrained ordinal-Pareto-efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332338

Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji (contributor) - 2006

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by S¨onmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321321

Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities

Takamiya, Koji - 2006

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sonmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012733933

The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects

Jaramillo, Paula; Manjunath, Vikram - 2013

We study problems of allocating objects among people. Some objects may be initially owned and the rest are unowned. Each person needs exactly one object and initially owns at most one object. We drop the common assumption of strict preferences. Without this assumption, it suffices to study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183375

Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints

Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi; Moulin, Hervé; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 395-423

In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689320

Influence in private-goods allocation

Raghavan, Madhav - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919044

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801

Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem

Duggan, Joseph E. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/11, pp. 1-13

The Stable Fixtures problem (Irving and Scott (2007)) is a generalized matching model that nests the well-known Stable … sufficient to ensure that starting from an arbitrary matching, a decentralized process of allowing the sequential matching of … randomly chosen blocking pairs will converge to a pairwise-stable matching with probability one. Strategic implications of this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167988

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2008

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3 ….3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching … correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. -- Matching with couples …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003771299

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