We expand upon the previous models of inequity aversion of Fehr and Schmidt [1], and Frohlich et al. [2], which assume that dictators get disutility if the final allocation of surplus deviates from the equal split (egalitarian principle) or from the subjects' production (libertarian principle)....

Recent work highlights that cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma (PD) is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing the right thing, rather than social preferences for equity or efficiency. By contrast, little is known on what motivates cooperation in the Stag-Hunt Game (SHG)....

We report on a large, pre-registered experiment testing the role of moral preferences in oneshot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. We measure moral preferences in two ways: through a decision problem with real economic consequences (the trade-off...

We report on a large, pre-registered, experiment testing the role of moral preferences in the ultimatum and the impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders. We measure moral preferences in two ways: through a decision problem with real economic consequences (the trade-off game), and...

We report on a large experiment testing the role of moral preferences in one-shot, anonymous ultimatum and impunity games, which vary the veto power of responders: in the impunity game, if an offer is lower than the responder's minimum acceptable offer, the proposer still receives his share,...