Showing 1 - 10 of 15
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012053162
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064758
We propose nonparametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete. These definitions leverage ex-ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future behavior and ex-post (random) choices from menus to identify actual behavior. The main advantage of our definitions is their independence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011933088
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012118935
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the DM's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866192
We propose a class of multiple-prior representations of preferences under ambiguity, where the belief the decision-maker (DM) uses to evaluate an uncertain prospect is the outcome of a game played by two conflicting forces, Pessimism and Optimism. The model does not restrict the sign of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014091839
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302365
We propose nonparametric definitions of absolute and comparative naivete. These definitions leverage ex-ante choice of menu to identify predictions of future behavior and ex-post (random) choices from menus to identify actual behavior. The main advantage of our definitions is their independence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112148
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584170
Motivated by the literature on ``choice overload'', we study a boundedly rational agent whose choice behavior admits a \textit{monotone threshold representation}: There is an underlying rational benchmark, corresponding to maximization of a utility function $v$, from which the agent's choices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671902