paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …

This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that …

matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such that the number of vertices that prefer M' to M exceeds the number of … vertices that prefer M to M'. We show that the problem of deciding whether G admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard. This …(n2) algorithm (where n = |A B|) for the popular matching problem in this model. Note that this model is quite different …

-SRI, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of SRI with preference lists of length at most d. We show …-SRTI admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the "most stable" version of this problem and prove a …

Motivated by the need for real-world matching problems, this paper formulates a large class of practical choice rules … developed in this paper in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2020), to design satisfactory matching mechanisms for India …

This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching … matching may fail to exist even when both couples and institutions have responsive preferences. Next, we provide conditions on … couples' preferences that are necessary and sufficient to ensure a stable matching for every preference profile where …

We study a many-to-one matching problem between institutions and individuals where an institution can possibly be … matched to more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view pairs of jobs as complements … characterize all preferences of couples where responsiveness is violated for togetherness so that a stable matching exists. We also …