The behavioral implications of large discounts have been viewed from two opposing perspectives. From an attribution perspective, a large discount signals low quality and decreases the overall appeal of the product, but from a motivational account, a large discount seems attractive and increases...

Should a monopolistic vendor adopt the selling model or the leasing model for information goods or services? We study this question in the context of consumer valuation depreciation. Using a two-period game-theoretic model, we consider two types of consumer-side valuation depreciation for...

This paper uses tools provided by lattice theory to describe the second-degree price discrimination problem faced by a monopolist seller of a network good, and to give a complete characterization of the optimal contracts it can use. We build a general model in a discrete and a continuous type...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on...

We study price discrimination by a monopoly two-sided platform who mediates interactions between two different groups of agents. We adapt a canonical model of second degree price discrimination a la Mussa and Rosen (1978) to a two-sided platform by focusing on non-responsiveness, a clash between...

This paper considers the problem of second-degree price discrimination when the type distribution is unknown or imperfectly specified by means of an ambiguity set. As robustness measure we use a performance index, equivalent to relative regret, which quantifies the worst-case attainment ratio...

We consider a setting where the firm sells a main service (e.g., air travel) and an ancillary service (e.g., in-flight meal) to two types of consumers (high-type and low-type, e.g., business travelers and leisure travelers). The firm decides whether to unbundle the ancillary service from the...