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This paper identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor sufficient to conclude that firms violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that, under competition, all firms setting a list price with a...
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A theory of tacit collusion is developed based on coordination through price leadership and less than full mutual understanding of strategies. It is common knowledge that price increases are to be at least matched but who should lead and at what price is not common knowledge. The steady-state...
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In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players communicate and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - which are private information. An impatient type is incapable of...
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Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; an information structure consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric duopoly games, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028165