Similar Search Results

Connor, John M. - 2006

the link between overt collusion and price dispersion. Formal theories and observation of cartel behavior suggest that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014062753

Information exchange through non-binding advance price announcements : an antitrust analysis

Boshoff, Willem H.; Frübing, Stefan; Hüschelrath, Kai - 2015

We study the welfare effects of non-binding advance price announcements. Applying a differentiated Bertrand model with horizontal products and asymmetric information, we find that such announcements can help firms to gain information on each other thereby allowing them to achieve higher profits....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316431

Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena; Herweg, Fabian - 2016

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434582

Manufacturer cartels and resale price maintenance

Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2020

We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with manufacturer and retailer competition. Because retailers have an effective outside option to each manufacturer's contract, the manufacturers can only ensure contract acceptance by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438202

Induced price leadership and (counter-)spying rivals' play under incomplete information

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2019

We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353

Manufacturer carterls and resale price maintenance

Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2020

We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with manufacturer and retailer competition. Because retailers have an effective outside option to each manufacturer’s contract, the manufacturers can only ensure contract acceptance by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012201242

Anchoring, reference prices, and list price collusion

Paha, Johannes - 2019

The firms in this model set non-binding list prices before competing for buyers by non-cooperatively granting discounts. Each firm has an incentive to set a high list price if, for example, the customers anchor their willingness-to-pay on the list price. However, list price competition occurs if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314193

Chapter 15 Antitrust

Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007

policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495

Manufacturer collusion and resale price maintenance

Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2023

retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer … manufacturers to establish higher prices. The use of renegotiation-proof RPM stabilizes collusion whereas otherwise RPM can decrease … the range of discount factors which enable stable collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014394250

Deterring collusion with a reserve price : an auction experiment

Pacharasut Sujarittanonta; Ajalavat Viriyavipart - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 24 (2021) 2, pp. 536-557

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012544401

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