This paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to, subject to a constraint on information flow. When idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to...

This paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention to, subject to a constraint on information flow. When idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to...

In this paper, we argue that differences in the cost structure across sectors play an important role in the decision of firms to adjust their prices. We develop a menu cost model of pricing in which retail firms intermediate trade between producers and consumers. An important facet of our...

We analyze export price adjustment of Swiss manufacturing firms using a novel data set of matched export, import, and domestic prices. After a large, unexpected, and permanent appreciation of the Swiss franc, export prices set in domestic currency fell less than export prices set in foreign...

In the data, individual prices change frequently and by large amounts. In standard sticky price models, frequent and large price changes imply a fast response of the aggregate price level to nominal shocks. This paper presents a model in which price setting firms optimally decide what to...

In this paper, we argue that differences in the cost structures across sectors play an important role in firms' decisions to adjust their prices. We develop a menu-cost model of pricing in which retail firms intermediate trade between producers and consumers. An important facet of our analysis...

We examine pricing in markets where products may be of heterogeneous quality and buyers have heterogeneous preferences. The sellers cannot credibly communicate the quality they offer, and consequently price acts as a signal of quality. We determine the equilibria of the model both when the...

We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but unknown value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially, and rely on a private signal as well as We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but previous buyers actions...