Constantly rising expenditures for pharmaceuticals require government intervention in firms' pricing decisions. To this end, reference pricing systems are a frequently employed regulatory mechanism. This paper considers a duopoly market with vertically differentiated firms under different...

This paper examines optimal two-period financial contracts between firms in a product market on the one side and banks as creditors on the other side. Similar to the Bolton-Scharfstein contracts, banks can mitigate the moral hazard problem of truthfully revealing the ex ante unknown profits of...

We show that concealing cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies. This result enables us to endogenize the number of firms in a market in terms of market size, entry costs, and unit cost uncertainty.

Der Beitrag sollte verdeutlichen, dass sich seit den Pioniermodellen mit unvollständiger Information mittlerweile eine recht heterogene Klasse von Ansätzen etabliert hat, die sich unter alternativen Grundannahmen mit der Frage auseinandersetzen, ob Unternehmen angesichts diverser...

We study interfirm price competition in the presence of horizontal and vertical intrafirm conflicts in each firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a principal-agent framework with firms employing more than one agent and implementing a tournament incentive scheme. The principals offer premium...

We study interfirm price competition in the presence of horizontal and vertical intrafirm conflicts in each firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a principal-agent framework with firms employing more than one agent and implementing a tournament incentive scheme. The principals offer premium...