We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash...

We analyze firms' ability to sustain collusion in a setting in which horizontally differentiated firms can price-discriminate based on private information regarding consumers' preferences. In particular, firms receive private signals which can be noisy (e.g., big data predictions). We find that...

We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing, when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index...

A monopolist supplies a homogenous good to two geographically separated markets. Production costs and demand conditions are di?erent in each market. A line with a limited transport capacity connects both markets. The paper compares two institutional frameworks: (1) exclusive access to the line...

This paper uses tools provided by lattice theory to describe the second-degree price discrimination problem faced by a monopolist seller of a network good, and to give a complete characterization of the optimal contracts it can use. We build a general model in a discrete and a continuous type...