In a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms, we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism. Price posting prevails when meetings are rival, i.e., when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer's meeting...

In formal markets, to attract buyers, sellers must publicly advertise their prices and locations. But in informal markets, sellers must remain anonymous from government authorities. Since agents' payoffs depend on the ratio of buyers and sellers in each of these markets, all agents try to...

We ask how the ability to recall past prices affects the dynamics of search and price formation. In the model, buyers have limited time to purchase a good and face uncertainty regarding the availability of past price quotes in the future. Sellers cannot observe a potential buyer’s remaining...

This paper complements Antràs and Costinot's (2010) analysis of a two-good, two-country Ricardian economy in which farmers produce either goods but require intermediaries to exchange their production in the goods markets. The intermediation market is frictional, whereas the goods market is...