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assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422137
One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent’s risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346
efficiency. However, fully efficient incentives are achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388480
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596
This note demonstrates how performance measure congruity and noise determine an agency's total surplus within an linear agency framework with multiple tasks. It provides a decomposition of agency costs, leading back to a congruity index previously proposed in the literature. In addition, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383032
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
Employees often learn about their ability while working, and the resulting beliefs interact with pay incentives to … job, dynamic selection, effort, and variation in pay incentives. The empirical analysis is based on unique data from a US … which pay incentives affect employment outcomes, profits, and compensation. Under the implemented and the profit …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972627
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral and financially constraint agent. The agent's performance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. it does not reflect his contribution to firm value, and thus motivates an inefficient effort allocation across tasks. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218745
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028223