Showing 1 - 10 of 221
Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334132
We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286686
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent's knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286708
Der Beitrag versucht anhand der Agentur- sowie der Stewardship-Theorie ein Rahmenmodell zur Erklärung wirtschaftskriminellen Verhaltens zu erarbeiten. Zu diesem Zweck wird neben einer Systematisierung der primären Interessenträger einer wirtschaftskriminellen Tat auch ein Überblick über...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533822
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001642015
The paper addresses the problem of the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor. We try to solve particular limitations of Agency Theory by presenting a complementary approach based on Organization Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. Empirical evidence stems from two industries with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204480
This paper explores the links that the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor maintains with labor transaction attributes and several structural traits of the firm. The approach is based on the transaction cost apparatus and harnesses the theoretical and empirical background provided by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204549
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117140
I study the design of sequential tournaments in which one agent makes his effort choice after observing the other agent's decision. In case the two agents are homogeneous and both risk-neutral, sequential tournaments are identical to simultaneous tournaments w.r. to prizes and effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117142
This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117143