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Lehmann, Erik - 2018 - Version , November 19th 2018

Corporate governance is a recent concept that encompasses the costs caused by managerial misbehavior. Corporate governance is concerned with how organizations in general, and corporations in particular, produce value and how that value is distributed among the members of the corporation, its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928257

When Does the Family Govern the Family Firm?

Bøhren, Øyvind - 2020

We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852878

Dynamic capabilities : the role of board monitoring and managerial incentives

Asija, Aman; Ringov, Dimo - In: Business research quarterly : BRQ 24 (2021) 4, pp. 268-280

dynamic capabilities are deployed may affect their value. Drawing on agency theory, we propose that corporate governance … propositions about the differential effect of two corporate governance mechanisms-board monitoring and managerial incentives-on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012694390

Stewardship Activities and Agency Problems after Japanese Corporate Governance Reform

Omura, Hiroyasu - 2020

code, in which stewardship activities by institutional investors play an important role in terms of reduction of agency … cost. In this report, stewardship activities are focused based upon the idea that agency theory, newly introduced as … agency cost reduction. In order to make governance reform more effective, I make several proposals, cost sharing of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014361849

Access, Common Agency, and Board Size

Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 2004

We study the impact of the size of a firm's board of directors on managerial incentives. We present a model where a … (the board of directors) who differ in the relative value they place on each task. We show that the agent's incentives are … related to board size. Board size is negatively related to managerial incentives. We also find that firms incorporated in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012738033

Family constitution to manage family firms' agency conflicts

Rodriguez-Garcia, Pablo; Menéndez Requejo, Susana - In: Business research quarterly : BRQ 26 (2023) 2, pp. 150-166

of agency conflict in family firms. We performed a qualitative analysis, through a case study, and found that the … constitution is useful in reducing three of the four agency conflicts described in the literature, specifically between family …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014281542

Debt, Control, and Collusion

Sokol, D. Daniel - 2021

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236520

Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure

Bourveau, Thomas - 2017

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970911

Chapter 4. Law and Corporate Governance

Bartlett, Robert; Talley, Eric - 2017

Pragmatic and effective research on corporate governance often turns critically on appreciating the legal institutions surrounding corporate entities—yet such nuances are often unfamiliar or poorly specified to economists and other social scientists without legal training. This chapter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023367

Firm Performance, Shareholder Activism, and Mandatory Executive Compensation Disclosure

Schantl, Stefan - 2020

-performance ratio and dependent boards' incentives to manage earnings are mitigated. Further results are consistent with the argument …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839787