Showing 1 - 10 of 611
This study analyzes how promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO senior executives affect corporate innovation. We measure tournament incentives using the pay gap between a CEO and the next layer of senior executives. We find that tournament incentives are positively related to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007441
Using the compensation gap between a CEO and the second-highest-paid CEO in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as a proxy for local tournament incentives, I document a positive relation between local tournament incentives and firm risk. Specifically, CEOs who face higher local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968276
Using CEO severance contracts during 1992-2010, we find that CEOs with a severance contract tend to reduce corporate investments, impede innovation, and decrease firm risk across several dimensions, leading to shareholder value destruction. This negative value effect is stronger during the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038171
This Article reports results of an empirical study that suggests that the current economic crisis has changed managerial behavior in the US in a way that may impede economic recovery. The study finds a strong, statistically significant and economically meaningful, positive correlation between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114205
IPO firms with high-powered CEO incentive contracts have lower failure rates in the aftermarket. Economically, an interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay translates in a reduction of the failure risk probability by approximately 21%. The Pay Gap between the CEO and its subordinate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898102
This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives: simpler mechanisms, robust mechanisms, and implicit contracts. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064724
This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133806
This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842651
We provide new evidence that equity incentives can have perverse effects on firm value. Conditioning the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) incentives and the risk exposure generated by corporate policy decisions on how risk is expected to affect firm value, we find that delta...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994292
This article presents a systematic review of the theoretical and empirical literature on option grants and managerial risk taking. One of the objectives is the motivation of further research on the topic. Risk-averse managers hold less diversified portfolios and, thus, tend to take less risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013368499