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This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319537
This paper provides a rationale for equal sharing in heterogeneous partnerships. We introduce project choice and information sharing to a standard team production setting. A team with two agents can choose whether they want to work on a status quo project or on an alternative project. If the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029071
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011978816
We study the impact of monitoring in a workplace context where both firms and employees are unable to perfectly observe … the individual worker contribution to total output. Therefore, in our setting monitoring is not aimed at reducing … monitoring. Workers' stance towards monitoring is ambiguous and depends on risk aversion and the disutility of effort. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014534559
Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284102
This paper analyzes the impact of wage comparisons among inequity averse agents on optimal incentive intensities in a linear-exponential-normal moral hazard model with multi-tasking. We consider individual and team production tasks that differ in that only individual production causes wage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107898
One major difficulty with the standard agency model is that it generally does not provide a closed-form solution. A second major difficulty is that the theory relies on the troublesome first-order approach. To avoid these difficulties but at the same time to allow a general utility function,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728982
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012942066
For the classic agency model (Holmström, 1979), under different assumptions, we offer a completely different solution than the standard solution in the literature. Our optimal contract has a closed form, offers a contingent fixed payment, and is efficient. In contrast, the standard contract in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034959
A manager's compensation contract and the level of resources available to him jointly influence his incentives to acquire information about different investment alternatives as well as his resource allocate decisions. We show that the optimal compensation contract induces investment allocations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037185