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We relate the design of contract law to the process of development. In this paper, contract law defines which private agreements are enforceable (i.e. are binding and enforced by courts) and which are not. Specically, we consider an economy where agents face a hold-up problem (moral hazard in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343845
I compare group to individual performance pay when workers are envious and performance is non-verifiable. Avoiding payoff inequity, the group bonus contract is superior as long as the firm faces no credibility problem. The individual bonus contract may, however, become superior albeit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047627
We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
our model. Our case study is the Holy Roman Empire, which had a relatively homogeneous institutional framework, state of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729114
Joint-liability is maybe the most distinctive feature of microfinance contracts in developing countries. Yet, very little evidence exists on the impact of joint-liability contracts as compared to individual lending contracts. On the one hand, theory claims that joint-liability plays a key role...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071636
I use the standard screening model to study the relationship between bribes and red tape. I argue that bribe-taking bureaucrats extract bribes by exploiting differences in firms' marginal costs of red tape and offer a menu of bribes and paperwork processing times, where a larger bribe is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870882
In this paper we analyze the factors that affect the choice of land tenure contracts in the semi arid tropics of India. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model with one-sided private information to explain the co-existence of wage, rent and share-cropping contracts. We generate empirically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576890
-tenant interaction in a principal-agent framework with one sided private information. The landlord has a choice of three contracts - wage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576992
While it is clear that in most settings, landlords generally contract with many tenants whose productivities are positively correlated, the salience of relative performance evaluation in the design of rural wage contracts has been little studied in development economics. This paper analyzes two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164781
The object of this essay is to describe and analyse contractual relations in two villages in North-east Bihar at a time when the so-called ‘green revolution’ promised much and the region had just started to benefit from canal irrigation. It is against this historical background that I will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011616238