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Dynamic incentive effects of heterogeneity in multi-stage promotion contests
Stracke, Rudi; Sunde, Uwe - 2014
compensated by positive continuation-value and selection effects. Due to these positive dynamic incentive effects of heterogeneity …This paper shows that the incentive effects of heterogeneity may be positive rather than negative in dynamic contests … with multiple stages. In particular, the well-studied adverse effects of heterogeneity in static interactions are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010394022
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Determinanten der Vorstandsvergütung: Eine empirische Untersuchung der deutschen Prime-Standard-Unternehmen
Rapp, Marc Steffen; Wolff, Michael - 2010
Basierend auf einem neuen, die deutschen Prime-Standard-Unternehmen für die Jahre 2005 bis 2007 umfassenden Datensatz untersuchen wir die Determinanten der Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung. Dabei unterscheiden wir drei Kategorien möglicher Einflussfaktoren: Unternehmens-, Performance- und...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305722
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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422137
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Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss
Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325487
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The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation
Sloof, Randolph; van Praag, C. Mirjam - 2008
This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small with a volatile environment where the noise is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325762
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Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - 2012
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326344
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Performance measurement and incentive plans
Kauhanen, Antti; Napari, Sami - 2010
This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273025
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Gift exchange and workers' fairness concerns: When equality is unfair
Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Kube, Sebastian; … - 2009
We study how different payment modes inuence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277484
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Managerial payoff and gift exchange in the field
Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen G. - 2012
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent's ability to repay the gift. We collect information on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280811
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Social relations and relational incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - 2012
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282065