Showing 1 - 10 of 524
The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites' challenge is to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011967393
will try to prove that if the social network is complete (i.e. it exhibits no gaps) then the coordination among agents is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132288
When partnerships come to an end, partners must find a way to efficiently reallocate the commonly owned assets to those who value them the most. This requires that the aforementioned members possess enough financial resources to buy out the others’ shares. I investigate ex post efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324334
We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors. The principal can either contract both agents in a centralized manner, or delegate one agent to contract the other. We show that the choice of the principal depends on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054349
provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are studied. When the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074357
limit. Applied to 2x2 Coordination Games, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is selected for a sufficiently large sample size …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281436
limit. Applied to 2x2 Coordination Games, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is selected for a sufficiently large sample size …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001622442
This paper considers the eff ects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041476
This paper considers the effects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165946
We study a two-period dynamic principal agent model in which two agents with different unobservable abilities compete in a contest for a single prize. A risk-neutral principal can affect the outcome of the contest by dividing a given budget between agents in each period and her net payoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950346