Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration - the abuse of authority - and by providing an empirical …

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration - the abuse of authority - and by providing an empirical …

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration - the abuse of authority - and by providing an empirical …

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration - the abuse of authority - and by providing an empirical …

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However … behavioral forces shape an important transaction cost of integration – the abuse of authority – and by providing an empirical …

This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by … the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to … authority thus depends on external market conditions as well as the information and agency problems emphasized in the literature …

This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance …