We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers. Thus, we compare the two models: (1) decentralized bargaining between manufacturers and retailers including two-part tariff contract (2) linear input pricing without bargaining....

The franchisor-franchisee relationship is unique in that it has characteristics of both an arm's length business transaction as well as an ongoing business relationship. As time goes by, however, the interests of the parties may diverge. It is in the franchisees' interest to make their...

Offshore outsourcing of administrative and technical services has become a mainstream business practice. Increasing commoditization of business services and growing client experience with outsourcing have created a range of competitive service delivery options for client firms. Yet, data from...

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) extend Vickers' (1985) Cournot model of strategic delegation to an infinitely repeated setting and conclude that delegation does not affect cartel stability if managers collude. This result rests on the assumption that managers are rational, but owners are not....