Hannan, Rankin, and Towry (2006, HRT hereafter) propose that an information system is capable of affecting honesty in the manager's budget report by reducing information asymmetry between the manager and the owner regarding the level of honesty in the budget. They find that going from no...

We argue that recent participative budgeting experiments designed to extend agency theory reveal the effects of responsibility, transparency, and accountability. We define these three theoretical constructs and present two experiments designed to isolate their main and interactive effects. In...

We argue that participative budgeting experiments designed to test agency theory predictions reveal the effects of responsibility, transparency, and accountability. We define these accounting constructs and present two experiments designed to isolate their main and interactive effects. In...

This study investigates the effect of a principal's choice on the availability of discretionary controls, where discretionary controls are defined as those not supported by enforceable explicit contracts. In contrast to prior findings on explicit controls, we find that agent reciprocity is not...

Given traditional agency theory assumptions and unobservable effort in a single-period setting, a moral hazard arises in which the agent is expected to shirk and provide the miminal possible effort after contracting with the principal. Traditional solutions to this agency problem include paying...