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Incentivizing team leaders : a firm-level experiment on subjective performance evaluation of leadership skills
Gall, Thomas; Hu, Xiaocheng; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2023
In teamwork settings, providing effective leadership can be challenging for team leaders due to multitasking and the …, which can ultimately impede the productivity of the team. To address this problem, we conduct a field experiment at a … manufacturing firm, introducing a relative subjective performance evaluation of team leaders' leadership activities by their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278019
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Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
Gong, Guojin - 2010
This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms' first proxy disclosures under the SEC's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules, we find that about 25 percent of our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136412
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Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
Gong, Guojin - 2010
This study examines the explicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in executive compensation contracts and the selection of RPE peers. Using S&P 1500 firms' first proxy disclosures under the SEC's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules, we find that 25.44 percent of our sample...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142627
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Relational Contracting and Endogenous Formation of Teamwork
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2016
We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We first propose the two-step approach, which is useful for characterizing the equilibrium of relational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007681
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Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
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Stock-based compensation plans and employee incentives
Zábojník, Ján - 2014
Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362951
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Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - 2016
We study a principal-agent setting in which both sides learn about future profitability from output, and the project can be abandoned/terminated if profitability is too low. With learning, shirking by the agent both reduces output and lowers the principal's estimate of future profitability. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864825
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
the performance measure and its similarity (congruity, congruence) to the benefit of the manager’s employer. A necessary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
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Performance-Based Vesting Compensation and Debt Contracting
King, Tao-Hsien Dolly - 2019
This paper examines whether the risk-taking incentives induced by performance-based vesting (p-v) compensation influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based compensation, as measured by the proportion of grant date...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865414