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Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
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Peer evaluation : incentives and co-worker relations
Sol, Joeri - 2010
truthful. Still, the principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and possibly complement it with a team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380732
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552994
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Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter - 2024
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493793
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Peer Evaluation : Incentives and Co-Worker Relations
Sol, Joeri - 2010
truthful. Still, the principal will always include such a bonus in the optimal contract, and possibly complement it with a team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142765
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Incentivizing team leaders : a firm-level experiment on subjective performance evaluation of leadership skills
Gall, Thomas; Hu, Xiaocheng; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2023
In teamwork settings, providing effective leadership can be challenging for team leaders due to multitasking and the …, which can ultimately impede the productivity of the team. To address this problem, we conduct a field experiment at a … manufacturing firm, introducing a relative subjective performance evaluation of team leaders' leadership activities by their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014278019
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Committing to incentives : should the decision to sanction be revealed or hidden?
Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2010
Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce compliance by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944178
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Bonus and Malus in Principal-Agent Relations with Fixed Pay and Real Effort
Kirstein, Annette - 2008
Drawing on the proposer-responder game examined by Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund (2003), I experimentally test four variations of a principal-agent relationship with fixed pay and real effort. Depending on the treatment, the principal can voluntarily, but at her own expense, (1) only reward...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012769841
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Tournaments versus piece rates under limited liability
Kräkel, Matthias - 2004
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343971
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001 - This Version: June 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539692