The issue of conflicting interests between company management and stakeholders arises when the management prioritizes its own compensation over the interests of other parties. This disparity in interests is commonly referred to as the agency problem. To address this problem, corporate governance...

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We examine how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establish necessary and sufficient...

The paper investigates the optimal structure of executive compensation with the possibility of financial data manipulation. We characterize the optimal compensation contract analytically, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for earnings management to occur. The model shows that the...

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We show that an increase in the possibility of manipulation actually calls for executive pay to be more responsive to...

We examine how clawback provisions and board monitoring affect managers' use of discretion to achieve earnings targets. Using an experiment, we find that when board monitoring is weak, imposing clawback provisions has little impact on the total amount of earnings management activity. This null...

This study contributes to the emerging literature on board co-option by examining how and to what extent co-opted directors influence managers’ attitudes about earnings management. We find robust evidence that co-option mitigates both real activities and accrual-based earnings management. Our...

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in Manufacture Public Companies at Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research aimed at knowing the influence of audit quality, proportion of independent commissioner, audit committee, firm size, managerial ownership and leverage. It used purposive...

Using a sample of 595 firms listed in the capital markets of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru for the period of 2000–2015, we confirm prior literature by showing that when power distribution among several large shareholders (contestability) increases, firms’ financial...

This study examines the impact of CEO inside debt on earnings management. Theory predicts that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings adopt less risky corporate policies and choose investment policies that result in less volatile earnings. Under such circumstances, CEOs would face weaker demand...

The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on...