We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors' increase of effort and firms' choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of...

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors' increase of effort and firms' choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of...

We use a unique database on family relationships between CEOs, board members and owners of private Norwegian firms to examine earnings management priorities of private family firms. Consistent with agency theory we find that private family firms generally manage earnings downward compared with...

In this chapter we highlight the differences between audits of private and public companies and review and synthesize the available empirical evidence, which is sparse in comparison to what is available for public companies. The evidence is fragmented and more research is needed in order to...