This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments and their most common alternative, fines, reduce collusion and bids … may trigger tacit collusion among the bidders who remain in the market, thereby facilitating the very behavior they aim to …

for auctions when all (initial) bids fail to meet the reserve price, we identify collusion using ideas similar to …This paper documents evidence of widespread collusion among construction firms using a novel dataset covering most of …

This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using … kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types …. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in …