In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers hut also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are...

This paper analyzes the generalized quality differentiation model in multi-sided markets with positive externalities, which leads to new insights into the optimal pricing structure of the firm. We find that quality differentiation for users on one side affects not only the side involving...

This paper analyzes the generalized quality differentiation model in multi-sided markets with positive externalities, which leads to new insights into the optimal pricing structure of the firm. We find that quality differentiation for users on one side affects not only the side involving...

This paper analyzes the generalized quality differentiation model in multi-sided markets with positive externalities, which leads to new insights into the optimal pricing structure of the firm. We find that quality differentiation for users on one side affects not only the side involving...

The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2010. Cross-border merger, vertical structure, and spatial competition. Economics Letters 109, 112-114]. Specifically, we prove that the Nash equilibrium locations of...

It is shown in this study that in the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a more efficient rival, contrary to what happens in the homogenous product...

Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) increasingly gain in importance with respect to the supply of pharmaceutical products and frequently use multiple or exclusive rebate contracts to exercise market power. Based on a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we...

We investigate the incentive for partial vertical integration, namely, partial ownership agreements between manufacturers and retailers, when the retailers are privately informed about their production costs and engage in differentiated good price competition. Partial vertical integration...

We study final product manufacturers’ incentives to introduce new products into the market and how they are affected by a merger among them. We show that when manufacturers distribute their products through multi-product retailers, a manufacturers merger, although it leads to an increase in...

Payment networks typically differentiate their interchange fees (IFs) by setting a variety of sector-specific IFs for the same payment card. While the previous literature on IFs has focussed on the optimal level of IFs, this paper addresses the optimal structure of IFs, i.e. whether or not IF...